Abstract. Dawkins (1990, Behav. Brain Sci., 13, 1-61) argued that ideas from economics can be used to assess animal suffering. In particular, she argued that the slope or elasticity of a demand curve generated by making an animal work for a commodity or the chance to perform an activity are suitable measures. Here a simple model is presented which suggests that neither the slope nor the elasticity is likely to be a generally valid measure. Welfare economists do not use the slope or the elasticity of demand curves as a measure of changes in welfare; they use the area under a demand curve. It is argued that this measure is also the appropriate one to use in the context of animal suffering.
Abstract. Dawkins (1990, Behav. Brain Sci., 13, 1-61) argued that ideas from economics can be used to assess animal suffering. In particular, she argued that the slope or elasticity of a demand curve generated by making an animal work for a commodity or the chance to perform an activity are suitable measures. Here a simple model is presented which suggests that neither the slope nor the elasticity is likely to be a generally valid measure. Welfare economists do not use the slope or the elasticity of demand curves as a measure of changes in welfare; they use the area under a demand curve. It is argued that this measure is also the appropriate one to use in the context of animal suffering. 1997 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour A fundamental problem in animal welfare is to identify conditions in which animals suffer. (Throughout this paper, I use the term 'animals' to denote non-human animals.) Dawkins (1983 Dawkins ( , 1990 suggested that measures based on demand curves (as used in economics) may be useful in this context. Her argument can be summarized as follows.
(1) Suffering is an unpleasant subjective feeling that is likely to occur when an animal is prevented from performing an activity that it is highly motivated to perform. (2) Animals will be strongly motivated to perform activities that are perceived by the animal to be important in terms of Darwinian fitness.
From (1) and (2):
Suffering occurs when unpleasant subjective feelings are acute or continue for a long time because the animal is unable to carry out the actions that would normally reduce risks to life and reproduction in those circumstances. (Dawkins 1990, page 2) (3) Concepts of demand and elasticity from economics can be used to infer the perceived fitness costs and benefits associated with an activity.
In this paper I am not concerned with points 1 and 2, but I try to evaluate the third point. I start with a review of the relevant aspects of economics and then look at its application to animal behaviour. Finally, I construct a simple model to explore the relationship between demand and fitness.
To develop my argument, it is necessary to comment on the term 'perceived costs'. Dawkins' approach to suffering is an evolutionary one.
I have suggested that suffering may occur when captive animals are unable to do something they are highly motivated to do because it would normally reduce a risk to their fitness. (Dawkins 1990, page 4) Thus, if an animal is studied in the habitat in which it has evolved (the 'natural' habitat), suffering can be expected when the animal is prevented from performing activities that make an important contribution to fitness. The situation is not so straightforward when the animal is not in its natural habitat. In such circumstances, the animal may continue to use rules that are appropriate for the natural habitat but are not appropriate in the current context (e.g. McNamara & Houston 1980; Dawkins 1983; Houston 1987) . It is for this reason that Dawkins (1990) talked about 'perceived costs', which she took to be the fitness costs as perceived by the animal. The approach that I adopt in this paper is to assume that demand curves result from an animal behaving in such a way as to maximize some function. I then investigate how various
